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THE POSSmLE EFFECTS ON MARITIME OPERATIONS
OF ANY FUTURE CONVENTION
OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
Edward Ashmore
When the Chief of Naval Operations
kindly invited me to initiate our discussions on this important subject, I had
hoped that the recent session of the
conference at New York would have got
a little further. That progress was made,
I am in no doubt. I am also in no doubt
that it is very important that at their
August 1976 session in New York
enough progress is made to enable
governments to agree to the broad terms
of a new convention which could be
finalized in 1977.
But because of this rate of progress,
it does mean that we can discuss the
crucial issues the conference has before
it in an unrestricted way and not feel
bound by any positions our own governments might otherwise by now have
adopted. Indeed, I must stress from the
outset that my views are those of a
professional naval officer, not of a

maritime lawyer nor of an official negotiating for his national interests in the
matter. But it is inevitable that I will
have frequently to refer to the arguments that are still taking place in the
conference for it is these that will
colour the backcloth against which any
future maritime operation will take
place.
Such operations in such a context are
of, course, a peaceful exercise of maritime power. I do not address the question of belligerence.
My theme in this discussion of how a
new convention might affect future
maritime operations is that the cornerstone of any future convention must be
the maintenance of the often challenged
but long established freedoms of the
Seas. I hope to show you that both
maritime and coastal states stand to gain
by the maintenance of this concept.
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Freedom of the seas, of course, implies
not only a freedom of action but a
responsibility to respect the rights of
others. I acknowledge from the start,
and I will go over the ground in more
detail later on, that we are living in a
changing world and that there is a very
reasonable case to be put which calls for
more careful definition of the rights of
states on, in, and under the oceans of
the world. States have every right to
look to their security and economic
interests: and the better understanding
that is reached on these issues, the less
chance there is of friction and tension.
A new convention will depend entirely
on a sound balance of all interests being
struck. The United Kingdom has both
maritime and coastal state interests. We
firmly believe in the maintenance of the
balance of strategic deterrence and
depend extensively for our livelihood on
unfettered contacts with our trading
partners-we have the third largest mercantile marine in the world (after
Liberia and Japan). At the same time,
our geographical position as an island
state, separated from our European
neighbours by the busiest straits of the
world, on a continental shelf rich in
hydrocarbons and fish, gives us significant coastal state interests. A balanced
convention is therefore as vital to my
country as to any.
We have only reached this view after
many years as a maritime nation and in
common with most of us here could not
claim to have been consistent in our
views over the last 2,000 years. Let me
say something since nothing is new
under the sun, least of all the ocean,
about those 2,000 years and the sum of
human experience they convey to us.
In the earliest days the sea was
believed not only to hold inexhaustible
stocks of fish, which were free for
anyone to take, but to extend over such
vast distances that the waters themselves
could not similarly be taken. What
could not be taken was free for common use by all men. To the Romans

who enshrined this principle in the
Justinian Code, such a view was
probably more a luxury that the undisputed masters of the Mediterranean
could well afford, since it was unlikely
that anyone would challenge it, rather
than an act of liberal statesmanship.
Nevertheless, after the collapse of the
Roman Empire there was no major
change to this principle until the crusades brought a Europe emerging from
the Dark Ages into contact with the
Mediterranean. This stimulus to commerce allowed Mediterranean practice,
Roman in origin, to spread to the
Atlantic seaboard, and the rolls of
Oleron gained immediate success and
wide recognition among the nations of
North West Europe. But although these
codes talked of freedom, this freedom
began to become discretionary. As
Mediterranean trade revived in the 13th
and 14th centuries, the conflicting
claims of the trading nations on the
waters around their coasts became the
dominant issues.
The Venetians began to charge a fee
for entering the Adriatic, and Venice's
chief rival, Genoa, claimed similar jurisdiction over the Ligurian Sea. In northwest Europe, countries made similar
claims: The Danes, Swedes, and Poles
claimed various parts of the Baltic and
the English, with what some of you may
feel was characteristic expansiveness,
the channel, the North Sea, and the
whole of the Western Atlantic. Slowly
the sea from being free from any jurisdiction became, like the land, subject to
the authority of those who had the
power to enforce that authority. But
the two great naval powers of the day
were Spain and Portugal and, using the
Pope as a maritime arbitrator which had
the wholly desirable effect of giving
their claims the authority of God, they
began to apportion the oceans of the
world between them so that both countries' interests in their newly discovered
possessions in the Americas, East and
West Indies, Africa, and India were
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protected. Their dominance culminated
in the Treaty of Tordesillas which, in
effect, divided the globe in half; a
feature which even the Pope had sought
to avoid.
With the growth of English naval
power in the middle of the 16th
century, her ships began to challenge
the monopoly of Spanish trade with the
Indies. The first Queen Elizabeth sought
to justify the activities of men like Sir
Francis Drake by an appeal to the
principle of the freedom of the seas-the
first time this concept had been expressed for four or more centuries. Her
Majesty refused to concede that Spain
"had any right to debar British subjects
from trade or from freely sailing that
vast ocean, seeing that the use of the sea
and air is common to all: neither can
any title to the ocean belong to any
people."
While England was having difficulties
with Spain, Holland, which was also
increasing in power, was having the
same difficulties with Portugal. The
Portuguese cited the Papal Bull of 1493
in support of their trade monopoly; to
counter their arguments Grotius wrote
his famous treatise on the law of the
sea. He stated quite categorically that
"Since the sea is just as unsusceptible of
physical appropriation as the air, it
cannot be attached to the possession of
any nation."
By this time, however, the British
had forgotten their late Queen's stand
and her successor, King James I, commissioned John Selden to write a refutation of Grotius supporting the concept
of a closed sea; a principle which was
duly followed so long as the British felt
that their interests were best served by
protecting their trade against foreign
competition. However, during the 18th
century there was a slow and gradual
change in British policy. The old order
whereby strong maritime powers waged
war to protect their trade was changed
by the Industrial Revolution in England.
There was for a time thereafter no

foreign competition, and so British interests were now best served by completely free and unrestricted trade.
Thus, by the early 19th century Britain
was once again an unequivocal supporter of the freedom of the seas.
It seems clear that the policy of the
superior maritime power, and not for
the first time, carried the day. When one
power has been predominant, freedom
of the seas has been its policy. It would
be an oversimplification to say that
when dominance of the sea was in
doubt nations pursued a policy of
closed seas which went unchallenged
until one power again became predominant, but it is nevertheless not far from
the truth.
Later on I will attempt to show how
the maintenance of the freedom of the
seas has developed from being principally in the interests of major maritime
powers to the situation today when it
safeguards the interests of the international community.
As trade increased, piracy became a
growing nuisance on an international
scale. Initially countries were content to
rid the seas of pirates harassing their
own trade while being quite content to
let them do their worst among their
rivals. Nevertheless, the consciences of
some enlightened men and the timing of
history ensured that piracy and the slave
trade were suppressed in an era when
the principle of the freedom of seas was
being upheld under the umbrella of Pax
Britannica. It could not have been effected in the absence of the freedom of
the seas, and the dividend this then gave
is enjoyed by all nations.
Another example of benefit from the
freedom of the seas is to be found in the
contribution to the surveying and
charting which has been done for over
200 years by the hydrographic fleets of
our various countries. Their freedom of
navigation and their cooperation results
in world chart series for all the mariners
of every nation. There is no ship which
does not benefit from the ability to sail
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and work on the seas of the world with
hydrographic data which has resulted
from this very freedom of access. Long
may it continue.
That having been said, we all know
that the law of the sea is not merely an
affirmation of unfettered freedom. The
freedom of the high seas became a
regulated freedom through agreements
by flag states that their ships should
follow certain rules about safety, avoidance of collisions, interference with
submarine cables, and similar matters of
general concern. It is important to
recognize, however, that ships were to
be regulated only by their own flag
states.
In more modern times came the
recognition that the coastal state had an
interest, and indeed a claim, on the belt
of water immediately surrounding its
own coastline. This claim was ultimately
recognized in the concept of the territorial sea. The development which
balanced this concession to absolute
freedom at sea was the establishment of
the right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea. Coastal states
accepted the erosion of full sovereignty
implicit in the acknowledgement that a
foreign ship could not be prevented
arbitrarily from passing through the
territorial sea so long as she was doing
no harm.
This harmonious compromise was
further developed by the 1958 Geneva
Conventions on the law of the sea. What
started as an attempt to codify all past
practice, in fact, went further and resulted in recognition of the increasing
attention being given to the exploitation
of the resources of the sea and the
seabed, and whilst high seas freedoms
were to a large extent preserved, these
conventions for the first time addressed
the rights to exploit the resources of
continental shelves and the conservation
of the living resources of the high seas.
The 1958 Geneva Conventions have,
I believe, served the international community well. The listing of the freedoms

of the high seas was useful, as were the
provisions concerning nationality for all
ships, piracy, and slave trading. So also
were the definition of innocence of
passage in the territorial seas as being
not prejudicial to the peace, good order,
and security of the coastal state; the
definition of the rights of hot pursuit;
and the safeguarding of the right of
passage through straits. There were also
many other valuable provisions relating
to navigation and resource exploitation.
But there were major omissions too, the
most far reaching being the failure of
the 1958 conference to agree on a
maximum breadth for the territorial sea
and the failure to set objective limits to
coastal state rights in respect of fisheries
and the continental shelf. The large
increase since 1958 in the number of
merchant ships sailing under flags of
convenience has also called into question whether dependence on flag state
regulation is sufficient to safeguard
coastal state interest.
The main pressure for a new law of
the sea convention has, however, been
generated by the increase of man's
knowledge associated with a desire to
exploit the resources of the sea and the
seabed. "The common heritage of man
should be used for the benefit of mankind as a whole" is a popular cry. If we
are to use the seas and the resources in
and under the sea for the benefit of the
international community in an orderly
fashion, we must aim to reexamine and
strengthen existing law to fit today's
circumstances and fill in the gaps in the
1958 conventions that I have already
mentioned.
There are, of course, a number of
ways of doing this, and it is precisely
because of this fact that negotiations in
the conference directed toward reaching
a consensus have been prolonged and
difficult. A position somewhere between the somewhat imprecise but
possibly, maritime oriented regime that
came from the 1958 conventions and
those states who have been calling for
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extensive coastal state sovereignty and
jurisdiction must be found.
We must not be discouraged by the
length of negotiations on this complex
subject. Each member state of the
United Nations surely has to attend to
its own immediate needs before acting
as a member of the international community to safeguard the broader world
interest.
With good reason coastal states are
concerned with sovereign rights, and the
obvious proof of the growing concern
for this is to be found in the large
increase in the number of states now
claiming a wider territorial sea. The
numbers have increased markedly since
1958. Some states believe that an extension of sovereignty over the sea is an
essential safeguard to their security.
There is much public discussion of
security, both in the defense or military
sense and also in the civil or police
sense. Many newly emergent and
emerging states think of increased
sovereignty as an essential precursor of
economic well-being. Many states also,
and my own is no exception, look to
the wealth of the natural resources of
the continental shelf to contribute substantially to economic well-being and
are showing a real concern about conservation of fish stocks and an understandable feeling that they should have
prime responsibility for assuring the
future of a resource they claim for their
own country. However we must remember the other side of the coin.
This is that to extend the frontiers of
sovereignty is at the same time to
increase the burden of national security
and certainly not to make it easier. If
we are to develop new laws, we must
ensure that either the coastal state or
the international community has the
ability to enforce them. Laws that
cannot be upheld fall into disrepute and
are certain sources of international friction. While I well understand the
importance of the work being done in
the present conference on the

settlement of disputes, I am sure we
would rather that its aim should be a
consensus likely to minimize the occurrence of disputes. Moreover, it is
axiomatic that the greater the area of
the continental shelf or greater the
volume of water that the coastal state
can lay claim to, the less the resources
freely available to others.
One of us here represents a landlocked state, and there are others
amongst us whose countries say that
they are geographically disadvantaged.
Any view that the seas are free requires
that the rights of every member of the
international community be considered
in drawing up the balance between the
interests of the coastal state and the
community as a whole. There is no
shortage of public discussion on this
either.
Coastal states have a third interest
which is gaining in importance as the
worldwide lobby for the protection of
the environment grows. None of us here
would quarrel with the need to take
every reasonable precaution to minimize
the risk caused by collisions and groundings or by poor construction of ships.
Pollution control, too, is listed high in
the requirements of all these days. It is
an important matter which the convention must address.
I mentioned earlier that flag states
had come to accept the need for certain
rules to guide the conduct of shipping.
An amalgam of these rules on safety,
the avoidance of collision and pollution
control add up in many minds not
merely to the maintenance of good
order but to the need for traffic regulations as the means of assuring it. Sealanes and traffic separation schemes do,
of course, have a valuable part to play.
The United Kingdom and France believe
that they have already been instrumental in improving traffic conditions
in the Dover Strait, and they look
forward to the observance of these
schemes becoming mandatory. I would
welcome also the establishment of
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similar schemes in other busy shipping
areas around the world. Latterly the
International Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) has taken the lead
in initiating international conventions in
this broad field of good order at sea.
However, IMCO neither lays down nor
enforces law. Governments use the
IMCO machinery to conclude agreements, and it is their responsibility to
give these agreements the force of law.
Should we not agree to urge our governments to place their trust in IMCO and
make proposals to it? Furthermore,
should we not also agree that we should
urge our governments to ratify conventions agreed through IMCO and to
enforce rigorously the ensuring legislation?
The international community currently accepts that outside the territorial sea it remains the flag state's
responsibility to enforce regulations on
their own shipowners and masters. To
overcome the laxity of some flag states
and in particular to regulate those ships
that sail under a flag of convenience, it
may be necessary to introduce a different enforcement regime. Consideration should be given to what seems a
very sensible idea that a form of port
state jurisdiction may well provide a
better balance between the interests of
the coastal state and those of the
international community, the theory
here being that a coastal state whose
regulations have been flouted and who
does not have confidence that the flag
state will take appropriate action will
appeal to the state into whose port the
offending ship next calls to prosecute
that ship.
Let me now summarize the coastal
state's interests as I have outlined them
to you. They amount, I suggest, to "a
requirement to extend their sovereignty
and jurisdiction into the sea area and on
to the continental shelf, adjacent to
their shores so as to ensure their state's
security, militarily, economically and
ecologically. "

I have previously laid emphasis on
the meeting of these justifiable aims
while preserving the natural maritime
rights of the international community as
a whole. Furthermore, in examining the
history of those rights, we saw how we
arrived at the basic doctrine of high seas
freedoms on the back of maritime
power. In the remainder of my talk I
would like to show that these freedoms
developed in the last 150 years now
safeguard the rights of the international
community.
The high seas freedoms stipulated in
the 1958 convention were the freedom
of navigation and overflight, the
freedom to fish, the freedom to lay
submarine cables and pipelines, and
other generally recognized and customary international freedoms.
I would like to dwell for a while on
what to us, as mariners, must be the
most important aspect, "freedom of
navigation and overflight."
We are not in this convention addressing the historic rights of warships
in time of war. Nevertheless, in spite of
the fact that I have barely mentioned
any military matters so far, I still see a
very clear role for the military in the
wake of a new convention. We are all
here because our countries deem it
necessary to maintain navies for reasons
of national security. Warships have
traditionally been involved with maintaining the freedom of navigation of
merchant ships, and we would claim
that the deployment of our navy in
support of trade has been a stabilizing
factor in increasing world prosperity.
In the past the number of ships
engaged in trade that plied the seas was
miniscule compared with the number
today. Under the umbrella of high seas
freedom and as the economies of the
countries of the world partly under
imperial influences expanded during the
19th century, trade began to flow in all
directions. This expansion has accelerated as the colonial empires have
waned and the colonies and pro-
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tectorates have become independent
countries. With the growth of international companies and the complex
economic relations that exist today, the
very foundation of our society depends
for its future on economic efficiency.
To carry cargo by sea is and will remain
in the foreseeable future the most cost
effective manner of trading. We see
examples everyday of the world's dependence on energy supplies, and the
battle against poverty and starvation can
only begin to be tackled with any hope
of success if trade across the sea is
allowed to proceed about its lawful
occasions, unhampered and unmolested.
Economic stability is intrinsically
bound up with the balance of power
and in this imperfect world in which we
live the balance of strategic deterrence is
of the utmost importance. We surely
must accept the fact that navies have a
part to play in maintaining that balance
of power and that they must operate
and train in the areas in which they
need to exert their power. These areas
coincide with the world sea routes
which, in many cases, pass through what
we expect to become economic zones.
Efforts in the past to declare zones of
peace have much to commend them,
but they will never be zones of peace
for all the fine words that are spoken
unless we can be confident that no one
will cheat. Let us not delude ourselves,
we cannot be certain of that today. No
doubt we all look forward to the day
when world tensions are eased and that
the opportunity occurs for the major
alliances to scale down the effort deployed to maintain this strategic balance, but we must deal with things as
they are and not as we would wish them
to be. Meanwhile we should, I think,
take advantage of the phenomenon that
we are in the presence today of an
expanding maritime power, which is far
from achieving that position of maritime dominance that I have historically
associated with allegiance to the
freedom of the seas and which seems to

be content, for reasons which are not
yet clear, to support a doctrine of
maritime freedom.
I have now outlined to you why I see
a requirement for the coast states' needs
to be put in perspective with the requirements to safeguard the rights of
the international community.
Let us then assume that we achieve
an acceptable balance of interest in an
internationally agreed convention. The
need will then arise for coastal states to
evolve internationally acceptable
methods of enforcing the laws which
they will be entitled and indeed have a
duty to enact.
Varying historical and constitutional
factors will influence the way different
countries tackle the task. It would be
wrong to assume that there is a single
correct way and if others do not do
things in the way we do, either they or
we are in error. I would like to explain
to you how we in the United Kingdom
see ourselves undertaking this. We could
have established some kind of force on
the lines of the U.S. Coast Guard and
this may be an attractive model for
many countries to follow. We have,
however, decided to meet our expected
increased responsibilities by the development and improvement of the existing pattern involving continuing cooperation between the civil authorities
concerned and our Armed Forces rather
than by some radical change. The Royal
Navy has for many years provided ships
for fishery protection duties, and
though the extent of this task will
increase, it will hopefully be carried out
in an atmosphere of international
accord.
As regards fixed offshore installations, these are of course subject to the
normal external threat posed by another
power and in this respect we see the
services defending them within the
framework of their normal function to
defend the realm. But today we face an
increasing threat from terrorists. Many
people advance the theory that an oil
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platform, like an aircraft, is an attractive
target for hijackers wishing to gain
publicity. Around our shores, in the
stormy waters of the North Sea and off
the Coast of the Shetlands, to hijack an
oil rig to make a political point such as
demanding the release of political
prisoners would be very difficult and
require considerable skill and resources.
There are many targets associated with
the oil and gas industries ashore which it
would be much more easy to tackle.
Nevertheless, there is a threat, and in
our view that is best met by mounting
deterrent patrols by ships and aircraft.
Sophisticated ships are not needed for
this. The important thing is to deploy
ships with good seakeeping qualities and
good communications. If the ships and
aircraft can be seen and heard they
deter, and if any incident occurs they
have the ability to get to the scene
quickly and observe and report. This is
also a priceless asset in the event of an
accident. A new convention will, we
assume, confirm the existing entitlement of the coastal state to establish
safety zones around installations on its
continental shelf and even enhance their
status. In the light of this we envisage a
requirement to operate a force of about
eight ships backed up by fixed wing
surveillance aircraft and shorebased helicopters to undertake concurrently
fishery protection and deterrent patrols
in the area of offshore installations. We
have choseA a 200-foot lightly armed
ship of about 1,300 tons to fulfill these
tasks. In the poor weather conditions
around our coasts we have decided that
an all-weather capability is more important than high speed, and thus the
fast patrol boat, an attractive option for
many countries, is not a realistic one for
the United Kingdom.
We also envisage these ships being
useful in reporting incidences of pollution and for assistance in maintaining
good order in traffic separation
schemes. Here our aim is to advise
shipping on the state of traffic so that it

can more easily follow the traffic separation scheme. We have not found it
either practical or desirable to attempt
to positively control the traffic, believing that no sea captain would take
kindly to being controlled from shore
and that an attempt to do so would be
likely to lead to more radio assisted
collisions than it avoided.
In all these tasks we see our forces
being used to safeguard our coastal
states' rights and at the same time to
ensure that the rights of the international community will be served as
well-they will be there to monitor and
report. The legal action that ensues
from any incident they observe will be
taken up by the civil authorities.
Maybe in due course an international
force should be set up to carry out these
tasks. Perhaps regional arrangements can
be expanded. We already have in the
Northeastern Atlantic a fisheries convention whereby some 14 countries
(both East and West) agree to the
monitoring of each other's fleets by
fishery protection ships flying an international fishery protection flag.
But before that kind of situation can
become commonplace we must achieve
an agreed and acceptable convention.
Inevitably there will have to be compromises. Some may not be to the liking of
the coastal states who may feel that
their sovereignty, their ability to exploit
their resources, is weakened. Some may
not wholly suit the maritime powers
who will find rights and privileges long
taken for granted will become conditional. And in the balance it will be the
coastal states who will have the major
increase in the responsibility for safeguarding all our rights in their waters.
Those of us who know how very seriously the progress of mankind can be
hampered by failure to resolve issues
such as those the convention has to
address can only wish the negotiators
well. I do not think I would be guilty of
heresy if I said that it would be nice to
think that the convention would put all
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us naval men out of a job, that there
would be no need for armed forces at
sea. But, as things stand today, there
can be little prospect of this, and only
by maximizing the flexibility of
maritime forces can the burden they
impose on national economies be
reduced.
Against this background of a future
where the rights and responsibilities of
maritime and coastal states will need
some degree of enforcement and a

future where, power politics may make
the movement of naval forces a sad but
necessary condition of preserving
peace and good order, may I suggest
that we could usefully discuss the
following points amongst ourselves:
the rights and duties of warships
under a new convention; the enforcement of the laws at sea; and the
need to continue to operate and train
in key areas to maintain the balance
of deterrence.
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